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THE UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT.1
That Pennsylvania has been the first State to enact into its
law the Uniform Partnership Act, as drafted and adopted by
The Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, is
eminently fitting, since the theory and principles underlying the
Act are those so ably enunciated by the late James Parsons and
taught by Mr. George Wharton Pepper of our local Bar. Fur-
thermore, the substance, form and phraseology of the Act are
principally the work of Dr. William Draper Lewis and other
members of the Philadelphia Bar. To these men is due the fact
that this Act adheres to the common law theories and ideas and
in great part conforms to the existing law in this and most other
States, 2 rather than to the theories and ideas of the legal fiction
of an entity, as originally intended. While the actual formula-
tion and drafting of the Act are the work of Dr. Lewis and his
associates, yet the thoughts and ideas are not theirs alone. Pro-
fessor Burdick, of Columbia University, the greatest authority
in this country on the subject, has, at all times assisted in the
preparation of the Act and has been of invaluable service in
maintaining the common law ideas. Professor Mechem, of the
University of Chicago, at a considerable sacrifice of time, has
generously contributed of his knowledge and ability to its prep-
aration. Professor Williston of Harvard, one of the Commis-
sioners and a member of the Committee having charge of the
preparation of the Act, by reason of his experience in the draft-
ing of other acts, his profound knowledge of the existing law in
general and his adherence to conservative ideas, has been of in-
valuable service and is entitled to especial mention as one of the
sponsors of the Act. By this specific mention of theorists and
teachers of the law, no detraction is intended towards the active
practitioners. Walter George Smith, formerly the president of
'Act of the General Assembly of Pennsylvania, No. iS, approved March
26, 1915, to be effective July I, 1915.
'See "Partnerships" by Prof. Burdick, 3o Cyc. 343; Burdick on Partner-
ship,; (2nd ed.) ; Gilmore on Partner-,hips; Partnerships in the United States,
5 The Commercial Laws of the World. (639)
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The Conference of Commissioners, and now chairman of the
Committee on Commercial Law, and Judge Staake, a member of
the Executive Committee, both of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
T. Moultrie Mordecai, of Charleston, South Carolina, George
Whitlock, of Baltimore, Maryland, Talcott H. Russell, of New
Haven, Connecticut, and many other Commissioners and law-
yers of lofng and extensive experience in the practice of the law,
have made like contributions from their knowledge and experi-
ence to the formulation of the Act.
Any intensive study of the cases on partnership law, in this
or any other jurisdiction, will readily disclose the present con-
fusion which exists on many branches of the subject. A dis-
cussion by the authorities on the subject discloses how difficult
is a definite declaration of the law with respect to particular
facts. The difficulty of maintaining a particular coitention or
the theories or principles underlying such contention is well
illustrated by the very able article, "The Firm as a Legal Per-
son," by W. H. Cowles, Esq.,8 and'the cases of In re.Berten-
shaw,4 and Sargent v. Blake.5  Such confusion is believed to be
sufficient justification for the codification of the law of partner-
ships. The fact that the law has been codified in England, in
most of our western States, and in quite a number of the other
States, is ample evidence of the fact that the law is sufficiently
established for codification. The sole question to be determined
is to what extent shall the law be codified and is the act in ques-
tion a proper codification.
The work of the codification of the law of partnership was
first undertaken by the late Dean Ames of Harvard University,
who attempted to eliminate many of the difficulties by the adop-
tion of the legal person or mercantile theory as the underlying
theory of partnerships. While this theory solved many existing
problems, new and perhaps more difficult problems were en-
countered. When Dr. Lewis and his associates undertook the
work, upon the death of Dean Ames, it was intended to main-
5S7 Cent L. .343
'157 Fed. Rep. 363 (xgOT).
r6o Fed. Rep. 57 (198o).
THE UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT
tain the theory adopted by him. So many and such difficult prob-
lems were encountered that it was deemed advisable to prepare
one draft of an act upon the aggregate or common law theory
and another upon the entity theory, and to submit both drafts
for consideration to those most familiar with the law on the
subject. As a result, the aggregate or common law theory was
determined upon as the proper basis for the Act. The common
law of Pennsylvania and all other States, excepting Louisiana,
which adheres to the civil law of the Code Napoleon, and the
statute law of the code States are all based upon this theory.
The entity or mercantile theory does appear in the cases, but it
is believed that a close study will disclose the fact that they have
to do with questions of account or a differentiation between sep-
arate and partnership property and liability. Since the weight
of authority, as evidenced by statute, decision and the writings
not judicial, supports the aggregate or common law theory, the
adoption of that theory appears appropriate even though some
authority may support the other theory.
The intent and purpose of the Conference of Commission-
ers of Uniform Laws, of the Committee of Commercial Law of
that body, and of the persons participating in the drafting of the
Act, has been, on the whole, not to create new law, but to declare
the existing law; not to declare the law of any particular
State, but the law as evidenced by the weight of authority
in all of the States. While some may contend that new law has
been created by a number of the sections of the Act, such conten-
tion can be supported by decisions only with respect to a few
sections, which will hereafter be noted. It must be admitted
that some sections have established new forms of expression,
though it is believed that no change in substance is thereby made
in existing law. Thus in Section Eight it is declared that real
property, including any interest or estate therein, may be con-
veyed in the partnership name. There are but few States, if
any, Louisiana excepted, in which conveyance may be so made
under existing law. The difficulties encountered with respect
to the conveyance and holding of real property by partnerships
under existing law is ample justification for this creation of a
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new form of conveyance. Even if some new difficulties may be
encountered by conveyances under the provisions of the Act, it is,
believed that these provisions will still be justified, since the
change is one of form rather than of substance.
Part V of the Act, declaring the property rights of a part-
ner, has been said to te a creation of new law. Lengthy discus-
sions of the property rights of a partner can be found in the
decisions. It has been definitely established in most jurisdictions
that partners are co-owners, but not tenants in common, joint
tenants, or tenants by entirety, the generally recognized forms
of co-ownership. It is also established that every partner is en-
titled to the possession of partnership property for partnership
purposes only, and that the same is subject to the payment or
satisfaction of liabilities to partnership creditors prior to liabili-
ties to the partners or their separate creditors. A confusion
exists as to whether the interest of a partner is solely personal
property, or may comprise both real and personal- property;
whether the specific property is subject to attachment by a sep-
arate judgment creditor of a partner; and whether as against
partnership creditors, rights of exemption, dower, courtesy,
homestead, or similar allowances can be claimed. The Western
code States have, by statute, declared partners acquire and hold
property as tenants in partnership, the incidents of which owner-
ship are practically the incidents declared, in Section Twenty-five
of the Act. The actual result of the decisions in most other
States is a declaration of the incidents of partnership ownership
as set forth in Section Twenty-five. The specific recognition of
a new tenure, tenancy in partnership, appears, therefore, to be
quite appropriate, especially since the change produced thereby
appears to be only one of form. rather than of substance. If
further justification be needed, the elimination of the confusion
of decisions and statutes relating to the rights of a judgment
creditor or a partner to attach or seize a partner's interest in a
partnership, or the specific property of the partnership, would
appear to be in itself sufficient justification. The adoption from
the English law of the "Charging Order" for the purpose of sub-
jecting the interest of a partner in a partnership to the payment
and satisfaction of his separate liabilities appears to be a justifi-
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able innovation in the remedial law of this country, the success
of which will depend upon the flexibility of our procedure and
the attitude of our courts.
By Sections Twenty-four, Twenty-five and Twenty-six, it
is believed, there has been achieved those benefits which might
have resulted from the adoption of the legal entity theory with
the elimination of its concomitant evils. Though changes may
be introduced in some respects by these sections, such changes
are dearly declared, and little confusion should result.
With respect to the liability of partners, such liability is, as
heretofore, joint and several with respect to torts, and joint with
respect to other debts and obligations.
The- questions of actions, judgments, executions, service,
pleadings, accounts, compromises, and other questions of pro-
cedure, are not affected by the Act, and:. remain as- heretofore;
except as provided by Section Twenty-eight, which creates a
"charging order" for the enforcement of the judgment of a sep..-
arate creditor against a partner's interest. Actions upon firm
liabilities will hereafter be instituted and maintained in the
form and manner permitted by existing law, the only remedial
statute affected by the Act being the statute relating.to judgments
against partners upon separate- liabilities, in Pennsylvania, the
Act of April 8, z873,' which is repealed.
Section Sixteen of -the Act declares the righti and liabilities
of a-partner by estoppel.. The existing confusion and uncertain-
ties with respect to the rights and liabilities of such- person are
ample- justification -for the insertion of this section. Even if
some problems be left unsettled and new problems be introduced
by this section, as drafted, the specifit declaration of the nature
of the.liability, of. a-person-made liable, as a partner by estoppel,
and the elimination of the uncertainty as. to the rights of- credit-
ors and the character of-action, will doubtless justify this section.
The precise and intended departures from existing law are-
five in number: Section Seventeen. creating a liability of -an in,-
cming partner for pre-existing obligations of the partnership,
which liability shall be satisfied out of partnership prbperty only;
Section Twenty-nine, declaring that the dissolution of a partner-
*P. L 6s, It.
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ship is the change in the relation of the partners caused by any
partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on as distin-
guished from the winding up of the business; Section Thirty-
four, b, which declares that when the dissolution is caused by the
death or bankruptcy of a partner, each remaining partner is lia-
ble to his co-partners for his share of any liability theretofore
created by a partner, unless such partner, acting for the partner-
ship, had knowledge or notice of the death or bankruptcy; Sec-
tion Thirty-five, a, requiring notice of dissolution to be given
only to persons who have had relations with the partnership by
which a credit was extended upon the faith of the partnership;
and Section Forty-one, which in certain cases imposes liability
upon persons contirluing the business of a partnership, the affairs
of which have not been liquidated. It is submitted that Section
Seventeen is expedient and justifiable for the protection of cred-
itors. The admission of a new partner has heretofore created a
new partnership and two separate classes of partnership credit-
ors and partnership assets, even though neither the assets, author-
ity or liability of the members of the existing partnership were
diminished. The incoming partner, as heretofore, may, by con-
tract, protect himself against such liability. Whether or not pro-
cedural difficulties will be encountered will depend upon the pro-
cedural statutes and the attitude of the court. The intent and
purpose of Section Twenty-nine is to differentiate between dis-
solution and termination of a partnership, and to eliminate the
creation of a new partnership by the admission of a new partner
when no partner retires, thereby -preventing the creation of two
classes of creditors and the confusion of their respective rights
as to partnership assets. The protection of creditors appears to
justify this innovation. At common law agents and partners
were'required to take notice of the death of the principal or co-
partner, which forthwith terminated authority. This rule has
been modified by modern statutes in this country and in England,
and may not have been the law of Pennsylvania. Under Section
Thirty-four, a, this modem movement is introduced into part-
nership law when the dissolution is by death or bankruptcy to
the extent of imposing liability upon the partners not deceased or
bankrupt for the act of any partner acting for the partnership,
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without knowledge or notice of the dcath or bankruptcy. Busi-
riess expediency and the equities as between the remaining part-
ners appear to justify the innovation. Under the general con-
mon law, notice of dissolution was required with respect to all
persons who had business dealings with the partnership, if sub-
sequent liability was to be prevented. A few jurisdictions lim-
ited this requirement of notice to persons who had previously ex-
tended a credit to the partnership. The section as drafted ad-
heres to this minority rule. The several provisions of Section
* Forty-one are intended to protect the rights of creditors of sev-
eral succeeding partnerships, and to eliminate the confusion re-
sulting from the assets of one partnership being transferred to
another partnership without notice of dissolution or liquidation
of affairs.
Attention is called to the repeal of the Act of April 6, 18707
relating to a loan to a partnership upon agreement to receive a
share of the profits in lieu of interest.
The limitations of space will not permit a detailed discussion
of the various sections.of the Act or their bearing upon the law
of Pennsylvania. The Act is a general statute, defining with
more .or less particularity the rights of partners, partnership.
creditors, and the separate creditors of the partners, and is such
as should be noted by persons interested in partnership business
or affairs.- Though one may dissent from the provisions of a
particular section, or the phraseology or substance of other sec-
tions, such dissent would be merdy a personal opinion and of
little weight in view of the character and reputation of the per-
sons who have assisted in and are responsible for the formula-
tion and adoption of the Act. The skill and ability which have
been employed in the drafting of the Act appear to justify its
enactment into the law of any. State. Adverse criticism, unless
supported by clear and precise authority, should not be permitted
to prevent its enactment, especially since the Act as a whole is
conservative, and generally adheres to existing law.
James B. Lichtenberger.
Philadelphia.
"P. 1 66,1z.
